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Abstract
When estimating a probability density within the empirical Bayes framework, the non-
parametric maximum likelihood estimate (NPMLE) tends to overfit the data. This issue is
often taken care of by regularization – a penalty term is subtracted from the marginal log-
likelihood before the maximization step, so that the estimate favors smooth densities. The
majority of penalizations currently in use are rather arbitrary brute-force solutions, which
lack invariance under reparametrization. This contradicts the principle that, if the under-
lying model has several equivalent formulations, the methods of inductive inference should
lead to consistent results. Motivated by this principle and following an information-theoretic
approach similar to the construction of reference priors, we suggest a penalty term that guar-
antees this kind of invariance. The resulting density estimate constitutes an extension of
reference priors.
Keywords: Parameter estimation, Bayesian inference, Bayesian hierarchical modeling, invari-
ance, consistency, hyperparameter, hyperprior, MPLE, reference prior, Jeffreys prior, missing
information, expected information, information gain
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1 Introduction
Inferring a parameter θ P Θ from a measurement x P X using Bayes’ rule requires prior knowl-
edge about θ, which is not given in many applications. This has led to a lot of controversy
in the statistical community and to harsh criticism concerning the objectivity of the Bayesian
approach. In the past decades, Bayesian statisticians have given (at least) two solutions to the
dilemma of missing prior information:
(A) (non-informative) objective priors: Objective Bayesian analysis and, in particular,
reference priors [3, 1, 2] apply mostly information theoretic ideas to construct priors that
are invariant under reparametrization and can be argued to be non-informative.
(B) empirical Bayes methods: If independent measurements xm P X , m “ 1, . . . ,M , are
given for a large number M of ‘individuals’ with individual parametrizations θm P Θ,
which is the case in many statistical studies, empirical Bayes methods [22, 6, 10, 5, 19] use
this knowledge to construct an informative prior as a first step and then apply it for the
Bayesian inference of the individual parametrizations θm (or any future parametrization θ˚
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
00
06
4v
4 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  4
 M
ay
 20
18
with measurement x˚) in a second step. A typical application is the retrieval of patient-
specific parametrizations in large clinical studies (e.g. [21]). However, as discussed below,
many of these methods fail to be consistent under reparametrization.
The aim of this manuscript is to extend the construction of reference priors to the empirical
Bayes framework in order to derive transformation invariant and informative priors from such
‘cohort data’. We will perform this construction along the lines of the definition of reference
priors [2] and use a similar notation. Likewise, we concentrate mainly on problems with one
continuous parameter (Θ Ď Rd, d “ 1), possible generalizations to the multiparameter case
d ą 1 are discussed in Section 6.
This paper is organized as follows. After introducing the notation in Section 2, we discuss
empirical Bayes methods and the inconsistency of maximum penalized likelihood estimation
(MPLE) under reparametrization, which is the main motivation for our work, in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a solution to this issue by following the same ideas as for the construction of
reference priors. A rigorous definition and analysis of so-called empirical reference priors is given.
Section 5 shows a numerical example of density estimation in the empirical Bayes framework
which illustrates how the lack of invariance under reparametrization has been tackled. In Section
6 we discuss possible generalizations of our approach to the multiparameter case d ą 1, followed
by a short conclusion in Section 7.
2 Setup and Notation
We will work in the empirical Bayes framework described above and visualized in Figure 1. The
likelihood model will be denoted
M “  ppx|θq, x P X , θ P Θ(.
Note that x P X Ď Rn (and also each xm) denotes the complete observation vector and M the
corresponding model. This convention is necessary because our theory requires the introduction
of (artificial) independent replications of the entire experiment, denoted by the model
Mk “
!
pp~x|θq “
kź
i“1
ppxpiq|θq, ~x P X k, θ P Θ
)
.
We adopt the standard abuse of notation, denoting all density functions by the letter p and
letting the argument indicate which random variable it belongs to, e.g. ppxq is the marginal
density of x while ppθ|xq denotes the posterior density of θ given x. In addition, pipθq will
denote any other possible (proposed, guessed or estimated) prior on Θ from some class P of
admissible priors, ppx|piq :“ ş ppx|θqpipθqdθ the corresponding prior predictive distribution and
pipθ|xq9pipθqppx|θq the corresponding posterior.
If the prior is viewed as a hyperparameter pi P P, we assume conditional independence of pi and
x given θ. Then the marginal likelihood of pi given the entire data X “ px1, . . . , xM q is
Lppiq “ Lppi |M, Xq “
Mź
m“1
ppxm|piq, ppx|piq “
ż
ppx|θqpipθqdθ. (1)
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Figure 1: Graphical model and schematic representation of the underlying probabilistic model.
Such a setup will be referred to as empirical Bayes framework.
We will also assume both the parametric and the hyperparametric model to be identifiable, see
[28, Section 5.5], i.e.
ppx|θ1q “ ppx|θ2q ðñ θ1 “ θ2, θ1, θ2 P Θ, (2)
ppx|pi1q “ ppx|pi1q ðñ pi1 “ pi2, pi1, pi2 P P. (3)
since otherwise there would be no chance to recover the true distribution ppθq from no matter
how many measurements.
3 Inconsistency of Empirical Bayes Methods
Roughly speaking, empirical Bayes methods perform statistical inference in two steps – first,
they estimate the prior using all measurements xm and second, they apply Bayes’ rule with
that prior for each xm separately
1. We concentrate on the first step, which is often performed
by maximizing the marginal likelihood Lppiq, for which the EM algorithm introduced by [9] is
the standard tool. This procedure can be viewed as an interplay of frequentist and Bayesian
statistics: The prior is chosen by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), the actual individual
parametrizations are then inferred using Bayes’ rule.
However, in the nonparametric case (meaning, that no finite-dimensional parametric form of
the prior is assumed), it can be proven that the marginal likelihood Lppiq is maximized by a
discrete distribution piMLE
piMLE “ arg max
pi
logLppiq “
Nÿ
ν“1
wνδθˇν , N ďM, wν ą 0,
Nÿ
ν“1
wν “ 1, (4)
with at most M nodes θˇν , see [17, Theorems 2-5] or [18, Theorem 21]. This typical issue of
overfitting the data is often dealt with by subtracting a roughness penalty (or regularization
term) Φppiq “ Φppi |Mq from the marginal log-likelihood function logLppiq, such that smooth
1For theoretical purposes one should rather think of applying Bayes’ rule to some future measurement x˚
to infer its parametrization θ˚ in order to avoid reusing the data. In practice and for a large number M
of measurements this distinction is of little relevance, since the influence of one data point xm on the prior
estimation is usually negligible.
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or non-informative priors are favored, resulting in the so-called maximum penalized likelihood
estimate (MPLE):
piMPLE “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ´ γΦppiq. (5)
The constant γ ą 0 balances the trade-off between goodness of fit and smoothness or non-
informativity of the prior. This approach can be viewed from the Bayesian perspective as
choosing a hyperprior pppiq9 e´γΦppiq for the hyperparameter pi and performing a maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimation for pi:
piMAP “ arg max
pi
Lppiq pppiq “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ´ γΦppiq “ piMPLE . (6)
Favorable properties of the roughness penalty function Φppiq “ Φppi |Mq are:
(a) non-informativity: Without any extra information about the parameter or the prior, we
want to keep our assumptions to a minimum (in the sense of objective Bayes methods).
(b) invariance under transformations of the parameter space Θ (reparametrizations)
(c) invariance under transformations of the measurement space X
(d) convexity: Since logLppiq is concave in the NPMLE case [18, Section 5.1.3], a convex penalty
function Φppiq would guarantee a concave optimization problem (5).
(e) natural and intuitive justification
The penalty functions currently used are mostly ad hoc and rather brute force solutions that
confine amplitudes (e.g. ridge regression [20, Section 1.6]) or derivatives (see e.g. [12, 25]) of the
prior, which are neither invariant under reparametrizations nor have a natural derivation. A
more contemporary alternative is to use Dirichlet process hyperpriors pppiq, which have similar
limitations. In order to incorporate the notion of non-informativity, [11] suggested to use the
entropy as a roughness penalty,
ΦHθppiq “ ´Hθppiq “
ż
X
pipθq log pipθqdθ, (7)
which is a very natural approach from an information-theoretic point of view, since high entropy
corresponds to high uncertainty or non-informativity of the prior. However, ΦHθ is not invariant
under reparametrizations, making it, as Good puts it, “somewhat arbitrary” [11, p. 912]:
“It could be objected that, especially for a continuous distribution, entropy is some-
what arbitrary, since it is variant under a transformation of the independent vari-
able.”
Following Shannon’s derivation of the entropy Hθ, we will explain why the concepts of mutual
information and missing information, both of which are invariant under transformations, are far
more natural quantities to use in our setup. Prior to that, let us make the notion of invariance
more precise.
3.1 Invariance under Transformations
Invariance under transformations guarantees consistency of the resulting probability density
estimate and follows the following principle: If two statisticians use equivalent models to explain
equivalent data their results must be consistent, or, as Shore and Johnson [24] put it,
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“[. . . ] reasonable methods of inductive inference should lead to consistent results
when there are different ways of taking the same information into account (for
example, in different coordinate systems).”
Let us start with the definition:
Definition 1. Let X “ px1, . . . , xM q be data generated by a model M “ tppx|θq, x P X , θ P
Θ Ď Rdu and F “ F rM, Xs be a function operating on probability densities in Rd.
(i) We call F invariant under transformations of the parameter θ or invariant under reparamet-
rization, if F rM, Xsppiq “ F rMϕ, Xspϕ˚piq for any diffeomorphism ϕ : Θ Ñ Θ˜, θ ÞÑ θ˜,
where the transformed model Mϕ is given by
ppx|θ˜q “ p`x|θ “ ϕ´1pθ˜q˘. (8)
(ii) We call F invariant under transformations of the measurement x, if F rM, Xs “ F rMψ, Xψs
for any diffeomorphism ψ : X Ñ X˜ , x ÞÑ x˜, where the transformed model Mψ and data
Xψ “ px˜1, . . . , x˜M q are given by
ppx˜|θq “ ψ˚ppx|θq
ˇˇˇ
x˜
“ ˇˇdetpψ´1q1px˜qˇˇ ¨ p`x “ ψ´1px˜q | θ˘, x˜m “ ψpxmq. (9)
Here, ϕ˚ and ψ˚ denote the pushforwards of some measure (or density) under ϕ and ψ, respec-
tively.
If we wish to use the function F for the estimation of the prior pi (as in equation (5) for
F “ logL ´ γΦ), invariance of F causes the following diagrams to commute. Note that, if
we restrict the considerations to some class P of admissible priors, then this class needs to be
transformed correspondingly, Pϕ :“ tϕ˚pi, pi P Pu, such that the considered class of priors is
consistent under reparametrization.
pM,P, Xq pMϕ,Pϕ, Xq
piestpθq piϕestpθ˜q
ϕ
estimation of pi
ϕ´1
estimation of pi
ϕ˚
ϕ´1˚
pM,P, Xq pMψ,P, Xψq
piestpθq piψestpθq
ψ
estimation of pi
ψ´1
estimation of pi
ψ˚
ψ´1˚
Figure 2: Commutative diagrams illustrating the consistency of the density estimate piestpθq.
If the estimation is performed in a transformed parameter space Θ˜ or measurement space X˜
(the modelM, the class P of admissible priors and the data X “ px1, . . . , xM q are transformed
accordingly), the results should be consistent.
One class of functions that fulfills these invariance properties is introduced in the following
theorem, where we also show that the marginal likelihood Lppiq is transformation invariant.
Theorem 2. Let X “ px1, . . . , xM q be data stemming from a modelM “ tppx|θq, x P X , θ P Θu
and
Fgppiq “ FgrMsppiq “
ż
Θ
ż
X
pipθq ppx|θq g
´ ppx|θq
ppx|piq
¯
dx dθ
for some measurable function g : RÑ R, such that the integral is defined. Then Fg is invariant
under transformations of θ and x. Further, the marginal likelihood Lppiq “ Lppi |M, Xq defined
by (1) is invariant under transformations of θ and x up to a multiplicative constant.
Proof. This is a straightforward application of the change of variables formula.
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4 Objective Bayesian Approach to Empirical Bayes Methods
The lack of invariance of common empirical Bayes methods described above will now be tackled
by an approach similar to the construction of reference priors and performed along the lines
of [2]. The two key ingredients for defining reference priors are permissibility, which yields a
rigorous justification for dealing with improper priors, and the Maximizing Missing Information
(MMI) property, which is derived from information theoretic considerations and can be argued
to guarantee the least informative prior.
Permissibility states that (positive and continuous) priors may be improper as long as they
guarantee proper posteriors (which are the objects Bayesian statisticians are actually interested
in) and these posteriors can be approximated by using proper priors arising from restricting the
prior to compact subspaces Θi Ď Θ.
In the empirical Bayes framework, where the aim is to approximate the true (proper) prior ppθq,
improper priors are less of an issue and we will limit ourselves to proper priors. Furthermore, it
is completely unclear how to deal with improper priors in this framework, since the ‘restriction
property’ of reference priors is neither achievable nor desirable, see Remark 8 and Example 9.
For this reason and since the concept of permissibility has been elaborated extensively in [2],
we will just state its definition.
Definition 3 (Permissibility). A strictly positive continuous function pipθq is a permissible
prior for model M, if
(i) for each x P X , pipθ|xq is proper, i.e. şΘ ppx|θqpipθqdθ ă 8,
(ii) for any increasing sequence of compact subsets Θi Ď Θ, i P N, with Ťi Θi “ Θ, the
corresponding posterior sequence piipθ|xq is expected logarithmically convergent to pipθ|xq,
lim
iÑ8DKL
`
piip¨ |xq }pip¨ |xq
˘ “ 0,
where pii denotes the restriction of pi to Θi, pii “ pi1Θi{
ş
Θi
pipθq dθ.
Here, DKL denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence defined by
DKLpp } qq :“
ż
Θ
ppθq log
ˆ
ppθq
qpθq
˙
dθ.
While permissibility is rather a technicality for dealing with improper priors, the MMI property
should be seen as the defining property of reference priors and will now be discussed in more
detail.
As motivated in the introduction, penalizing by means of entropy provides a natural approach
to incorporate the idea of non-informativity about the parameter into the inference process.
However, if we follow Shannon’s derivation of the entropy Hθ, we see that it is not the proper
notion in our setup.
Shannon [23] derived the entropy Hθ from the insight that the proper way to quantify the
information gain, when an event with probability p actually occurs, is ´ logppq. He then defined
the entropy as the expected information gain. However, the continuous analogue to this notion,
the differential entropy Hθ given by (7) , faces several complications:
• The information gain ´ logppipθqq, when measuring the value θ, as well as the entropy Hθ
itself can become negative, which is difficult to interpret.
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• Hθ is variant under transformations of θ, leading to an inconsistent notion of information.
• The information gain ´ logppipθqq relies on a direct and exact (error-free) measurement of
θ, which is not plausible in the continuous case.
The last point becomes even more relevant in the empirical Bayes framework, where θ is not
(and usually cannot be) measured directly, but is inferred from the measurement x of another
quantity. The proper notion for the information gain in this setup is the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between prior and posterior ([16]), DKL
`
pip¨ |xq }pi˘. Its expected value, the so-called
mutual information of θ and x or expected information from one observation of model M, is
always non-negative and invariant under transformations.
Definition 4 (expected information). The expected information gained from one observation
of model M on a parameter θ with prior pipθq is given by
Irpi |Ms “
ż
X
ppx|piqDKL
`
pip¨ |xq }pi˘ dx “ ż
Θ
ż
X
pipθq ppx|θq log
´ ppx|θq
ppx|piq
¯
dx dθ.
The expected information has very appealing properties for a penalty term:
Theorem 5. The expected information Irpi |Ms is concave in pi and invariant under transfor-
mations of θ and x.
Proof. Concavity is proven in [8, Theorem 2.7.4] while invariance follows directly from Theorem
2.
As argued in [3], the quantity Irpi |Mks, the expected information on θ gained from k indepen-
dent observations of M, describes the missing information on θ as k goes to infinity:
“By performing infinite replications ofM one would get to know precisely the value
of θ. Thus, Irpi |M8s measures the amount of missing information about θ when
the prior is pipθq. It seems natural to define “vague initial knowledge” about θ as
that described by the density pipθq which maximizes the missing information in the
class P.” 2
Following this idea, maximizing the missing information results in the least informative prior,
making Φppiq “ ´Irpi |M8s an appealing penalty term in (5). It is now tempting to define
empirical reference priors by
pier “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ` γ Irpi |M8s. (10)
However, since Irpi |Mks typically diverges for k Ñ 8, the following detour around the opti-
mization formulation (10) appears necessary (as we will see in Section 4.2, some simplifications
are possible under certain regularity conditions):
Definition 6 (Maximizing Missing Information (MMI) property). LetM “  ppx|θq, x P X , θ P
Θ
(
be a model, P be a class of prior functions pi with ş ppx|θqpipθqdθ ă 8 and X “ px1, . . . , xM q
be the data consisting of M independent samples from ppxq. The function pi P P is said to have
(i) the MMI “ MMIpM,Pq property for model M given P if for any compact set Θ0 Ď Θ
and any p˜i P P
lim
kÑ8
´
Irpi0 |Mks ´ Irp˜i0 |Mks
¯
ě 0, (11)
where pi0 and p˜i0 denote the (renormalized) restrictions of pi and p˜i to Θ0,
2The notation in this quotation has been adapted to ours. Note that the first statement makes use of the
identifiability (2) of θ.
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(ii) the MMIpXq “ MMIpM,P, X, γq property for model M given X, P and γ ą 0 if pi is a
proper probability density and for any proper probability density p˜i P P
lim
kÑ8
´´
logLppiq ` γIrpi |Mks
¯
´
´
logLpp˜iq ` γIrp˜i |Mks
¯¯
ě 0. (12)
Both definitions are only useful if the expected informations in (11) and (12) are finite. This
can be guaranteed by restricting ourselves to some convenient class P of admissible priors.
Typically, one requires strict positivity and continuity of the priors as well as the existence of
proper posteriors, see [2, Section 3.3], but different choices of P are also thinkable. Similar to
[2], we now define:
Definition 7 (Reference priors and empirical reference priors).
A function pirefpθq “ pirefpθ |M,Pq is a reference prior for model M given prior class P, if it
is permissible and has the MMI property.
A probability density pierpθq “ pierpθ |M,P, X, γq is an empirical reference prior for model M
given prior class P, data X “ px1, . . . , xM q and smoothing parameter γ ą 0, if it has the
MMIpXq property.
Remark 8. Reference priors have the appealing property that their restrictions to any compact
subset Θ0 coincide with the reference priors on Θ0 (see [2, Section 5]):
pirefpθ |M,Pq
ˇˇ
Θ0
“ pirefpθ |M0,P0q, M0 “
 
ppx|θq, x P X , θ P Θ0
(
, P0 “
 
pi
ˇˇ
Θ0
, pi P P(.
However, unlike for objective priors in the absence of data, this property is not desirable in
the empirical Bayes framework, as explained in Example 9, and usually will not be fulfilled by
empirical reference priors. Therefore, a definition of MMIpXq using restrictions of possibly
improper priors (as in the definition of MMI) is not meaningful and we are forced to limit
ourselves to proper priors. This limitation is not too restrictive since the aim of empirical Bayes
methods is to approximate the true prior ppθq and improper priors do not play a major role.
For compact parameter spaces Θ (and in all other cases for which the reference prior turns out
to be proper), empirical reference priors provide a meaningful generalization of reference priors,
which then correspond to the case M “ 0, the absence of data X.
Example 9. Let the true data-generating prior be the uniform prior ppθq ” 12 on Θ “ r0, 2s
and M be the location model given by
x|θ „ N pθ, 0.52q, θ „ Unif`r0, 2s˘.
For a ‘large’ data set X consisting of M “ 100 measurements, the empirical reference prior
pierpθ |M,P, Xq will yield a good approximation of ppθq, hence its restriction to Θ0 “ r0, 1s will
be approximately uniform, see Figure 3. However, the empirical reference prior pierpθ |M0,P0, Xq
on Θ0 has to put much more weight on values close to 1 in order to explain the many measure-
ments xm which are larger than 1.
Hence, unlike for reference priors, the equality pierpθ |M,P, Xq
ˇˇ
Θ0
“ pierpθ |M0,P0, Xq is nei-
ther fulfilled nor desirable. Of course, in practice, the parameter space Θ should agree with the
domain of the true prior in order to be consistent with the data generating distribution.
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pitrue
pier
pi0er
data
Figure 3: Inconsistency of the empirical reference prior under restrictions of the parameter
space: pier :“ pierpθ |M,P, Xq
ˇˇ
Θ0
restricted to Θ0 does not agree with pi
0
er :“ pierpθ |M0,P0, Xq.
Instead, pi0er puts a lot of weight close to the right boundary in order to explain all the data
points larger than 1. Unlike in the case of reference priors, this inconsistency is reasonable in
the presence of data.
Let us now formulate and prove the key properties of empirical reference priors.
Theorem 10 (Invariance of the empirical reference prior). The empirical reference prior is
invariant under transformations of θ and x in the following sense:
pierpθ |Mϕ,Pϕ, X, γq “ ϕ˚pierpθ |M,P, X, γq,
pierpθ |Mψ,P, Xψ, γq “ pierpθ |M,P, X, γq,
where we adopted the notation from Definition 1 and Pϕ :“ tϕ˚pi, pi P Pu.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorems 2 and 5.
Theorem 11 (Compatibility with sufficient statistics). If the model M “  ppx|θq, x P X , θ P
Θ
(
has a sufficient statistic t “ tpxq P T . Then
pierpθ |M,P, X, γq “ pierpθ |Mt,P, T, γq,
where T “ tpXq P T M and Mt “
 
ppt|θq, t P T , θ P Θ0
(
is the corresponding model in terms
of t.
Proof. Since t is a function of x and a sufficient statistic for θ, we obtain
ppx|θq “ ppx, tpxq|θq “ ppx|tpxq, θq pptpxq|θq “ ppx|tpxqq pptpxq|θq.
This implies that the marginal log-likelihoods logLppiq and logLtppiq agree up to an additive
constant, where Ltppiq “śMm“1 pptm|piq, tm :“ tpxmq, denotes the marginal likelihood in terms
of t:
logLppiq “
Mÿ
m“1
log
ż
ppxm|θqpipθqdθ “
Mÿ
m“1
log ppxm|tmq ` Ltppiq.
Since the expected information is also invariant under such transformations, Irpi |Mks “
Irpi |Mkt s, see [2, Theorem 5], this proves the claim.
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4.1 Choice of the Smoothing Parameter γ
So far, it is completely unclear how the smoothing parameter γ ą 0 should be chosen. In
fact, even entirely different ways of performing the trade-off between Lppiq and Irpi |M8s are
thinkable. All theoretical results remain unchanged if we replace
logLppiq ` γIrpi |Mks by ΨplogLppiq, Irpi |Mksq
in (12), where Ψ: R2 Ñ R can be any concave function that is monotonically increasing in both
arguments. We will stick to the former formulation and choose γ via likelihood cross-validation
[26, (3.43)],
γ˚ “ arg max
γ
Mÿ
m“1
log p
`
xm |pierpθ |M,P, X´m, γq
˘
, (13)
where X´m denotes the data set X with the m-th point xm left out.
Proposition 12. The smoothing parameter (13) is invariant under transformations of θ and
x, as long as the class P of admissible priors is transformed accordingly, Pϕ “ tϕ˚pi, pi P Pu.
Proof. From (8), (9) and Theorem 10 we obtain
p
`
x |pierpθ˜ |Mϕ,Pϕ, X, γq
˘ “ p`x |pierpθ |M,P, X, γq˘,
p
`
x˜ |pierpθ |Mψ,P, Xψ, γq
˘ “ Cpxq p`x |pierpθ |M,P, X, γq˘,
where we adopted the notation from Definition 1 and Cpxq “ ˇˇdetpψ´1q1px˜qˇˇ ą 0 does not
depend on γ. This proves the claim.
4.2 Empirical Reference Priors under Asymptotic Normality
As proven in [7], the reference prior coincides with Jeffreys prior [13, 14]
piJpθq9Jpθq :“a| det ipθq|, ipθq :“ ż
X
ppx|θq `∇θ log ppx|θq˘`∇θ log ppx|θq˘ᵀ dx, (14)
under certain regularity conditions, which basically ensure asymptotic posterior normality. Let
us recall the basic results.
Condition 13. The likelihood ppx|θq is twice continuously differentiable in θ for almost every
x P X . There exists  ą 0 and for every θ there exists δ ą 0 such that for all j, k “ 1, . . . , d the
functions
E
«∣∣∣∣ BBθj log ppx|θq
∣∣∣∣2`
ff
and E
»– sup
tθ:}θ´θ1}ăδu
∣∣∣∣∣ B2Bθ1jBθ1k log ppx|θ1q
∣∣∣∣∣
2
fifl
are finite and continuous in θ. The Fisher information matrix ipθq defined by (14) is positive
definite for each θ P Θ and equals i˜pθq “ E “D2θ log ppx|θq‰, where D2θ denotes the Hessian
matrix with respect to θ. The model M is identifiable as defined by (2), the parameter space Θ
is compact and each pi P P is positive and continuous on Θ.
Proposition 14. Under Condition 13, there exist positive constants C1, C2 ą 0 such that, as
k Ñ8,
Irpi |Mks “ C1 logpC2kq ´DKL ppi } Jq ` op1q, Jpθq “
a| det ipθq|. (15)
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Proof. See [7].
Since the first term on the right-hand side of (15) does not depend on the prior pipθq and the
second one is independent of k, the reference prior coincides with Jeffreys prior piJ and the
definition of empirical reference priors recovers the form of the MPLE (5):
Corollary 15. Under Condition 13, Jeffreys prior piJ is the unique reference prior (up to
scaling).
Corollary 16. Under Condition 13, the empirical reference prior is given by the MPLE (5)
with the following penalty term
pier “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ´ γΦIppiq, ΦIppiq :“ DKL ppi } Jq , (16)
which we will refer to as the missing information penalty.
Theorems 2 and 5 imply the following favorable properties of the information penalty ΦI :
Corollary 17. Under Condition 13, the optimization problem (16) is concave in pi and invariant
under transformations of θ and x.
Proof. The concavity of logLppiq is proved in [18, Section 5.1.3], the convexity of ΦI follows
either from its characterization as the limit (15) of convex functionals or directly from the
convexity of the Kullback-Leibler divergence (see [8, Theorem 2.7.2]). Invariance is a direct
consequence of Theorems 2 and 5.
5 Numerical Computations
We illustrate the invariance under reparametrization using the location model
x|θ „ N `θ, σ2˘ , θ „ pitrue, (17)
with pitrue being an equal mixture of N p1, 0.52q and N
`
3, 0.52
˘
, truncated to the interval Θ “
r0, 4s, and σ “ 0.3.
We compare the performance of the MPLE (5) using Tikhonov regularizion Φ “ }¨}L2 and the
empirical reference prior (16), applied in both the untransformed space Θ “ r0, 4s as well as the
space Θ˜ transformed by ϕ : θ ÞÑ θ˜ “ exppθq. According to (8), the transformed model takes the
form
x|θ˜ „ N plog θ˜, σ2q, θ˜ „ ϕ˚pitrue. (18)
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Figure 4: Conventional penalty terms, here the Tikhonov-regularization, are variant under
transformations ϕ : Θ Ñ Θ˜, resulting in inconsistent density estimates (see also Figure 2). If
the estimation is performed in a transformed space Θ˜ it gives a different estimate than the
pushforward of the estimate in Θ, piϕest ‰ ϕ˚piest. Dashed lines correspond to transformed
densities. Here, piL2 denotes the MPLE using Tikhonov regularization as penalty. In order
to demonstrate the lack of invariance of the density estimate, we chose the same smoothing
parameter γ in both spaces.
0 4
0.0
0.6
pitrue
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ϕ
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ϕ˚
ϕ´1˚
1 55
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0.2
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piϕer
Figure 5: Due to the transformation invariance of the information penalty ΦI the empirical
reference prior estimates are consistent under reparametrization (up to a negligible numerical
error), piϕer “ ϕ˚pier.
Both optimization problems (5) and (16) are solved using the MMA algorithm [27] from the
NLopt package [15], after discretizing the parameter space with 200 equidistant grid points. All
priors are estimated using the same data consisting of M “ 100 synthetic measurements.
As expected from the theory in Section 4, we observe how the lack of invariance of conventional
penalty terms is resolved by the information penalty ΦI , without losing the effect of regular-
ization, see Figures 4 and 5. In fact, from an objective Bayesian point of view, ΦI is preferable
to Tikhonov regularization, since the resulting density estimate is strictly positive on the whole
interval – excluding certain parameter values completely from a finite number of measurements
appears unreasonable.
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6 The multiparameter case d ą 1
In the case of several parameters, the reference prior piref is no longer defined as the prior
which maximizes the missing information, but by the sequential scheme presented in [1]. This
scheme applies the procedure described in Section 4 successively to the conditional priors
pipθδ|θ1, . . . , θδ´1q, δ “ 1, . . . , d, after a convenient ordering of the parameters.
This leads us to three possible generalizations of empirical reference priors to the multiparameter
case. The construction from Section 4, in particular Definition 7, will be referred to as the one-
parameter construction.
(A) Adopt Definitions 6 and 7 exactly as they are. In the asymptotically normal case given by
Condition 13, this corresponds to the optimization problem (16),
pier “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ´ γDKL ppi } Jq ,
where Jpθq “a|det ipθq| denotes the (arbitrarily scaled) Jeffreys prior. This construction
provides an extension of the Jeffreys prior, not of reference priors. The reasons why refer-
ence priors are favored over Jeffreys prior in dimension d ą 1 are marginalization paradoxes
and inconsistencies of the latter (see [4] and references therein). It is yet unclear in how
far these arguments are valid in the presence of data. Hence, this approach might still be
justified in the empirical Bayes framework.
(B) In light of (16) and with the intention of generalizing reference priors, replace J by piref in
the penalty term:
pier “ arg max
pi
logLppiq ´ γDKL ppi }pirefq .
This yields an extension of reference priors and agrees with the one-parameter construction
in the asymptotically normal case (Condition 13), but not necessarily in the general case.
(C) Define a sequential scheme similar to the one used for reference priors. For simplicity, we
will restrict the presentation to the case of d “ 2 parameters θ1, θ2, Θ “ Θ1 ˆΘ2, but the
construction can easily be extended to any number of parameters. As is common practice
for reference priors, the parameters have to be ordered by ‘inferential importance’. We will
perform similar steps as the ones in [4, Section 3.8]. Note that, as in the case of reference
priors, this scheme lacks objectivity since it requires an ordering of the parameters, which
is a heuristic element and not unambiguous in many applications.
Algorithm 18.
(i) For every (fixed) θ1, the one-parameter algorithm yields the conditional empirical
reference prior pierpθ2|θ1q “ pierpθ2|θ1,M,P, Xq.
(ii) By integrating out parameter θ2 we obtain the one-parameter model M1 given by
ppx|θ1q “
ż
Θ1
ppx|θ1, θ2qpierpθ2|θ1q dθ2.
Apply the one-parameter construction toM1 to obtain the marginal empirical refernce
prior pierpθ1q “ pierpθ1|M,P, Xq.
(iii) The desired empirical reference prior is defined by pierpθ1, θ2q “ pierpθ1qpierpθ2|θ1q.
(A) and (B) are straightforward generalizations of the theory presented in Section 4. It would
be interesting to analyze the connection between the approaches (B) and (C).
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7 Conclusion
We successfully applied the approach for the construction of reference priors to determine a
transformation invariant penalty term for MPLE, which favors non-informativity of the prior,
namely the missing information Irpi |Mks, k Ñ 8. This interaction of objective Bayesian
analysis and empirical Bayes methods results in a consistent and informative prior estimate,
which we termed the empirical reference prior pier.
The smoothing parameter γ tunes the amount of information contained in the prior: The data,
represented by the marginal likelihood Lppiq, yields information about the distribution of θ, but
maximizing Lppiq alone overfits the data. The penalty term Φppiq, on the other hand, favors
non-informative priors. We performed this trade-off by likelihood cross-validation which we also
proved to be invariant under transformations (Proposition 12).
Besides invariance, our method has further favorable properties such as compatibility with suf-
ficient statistics and concavity of the resulting optimization problem (16). However, in contrast
to reference priors, the empirical reference prior is not and, as we argued, should not be con-
sistent under restrictions of the parameter space (Remark 8 and Example 9) and, up to now,
lacks an explicit formula.3
The generalization of our approach to several dimensions is not unambiguous and has been
discussed in Section 6.
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